Summary: Within the last decade there has been considerable renewed attention on the importance of British master and servant law in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a means of labor discipline and control. This article argues for further analyses of how the law was used within local contexts and specific industries and calls for increased focus on the role of the local state in labor relations. It argues that unfree labor played an important role in the development of some industries, and challenges claims of the demise of apprenticeship in later nineteenth-century England. Through an analysis of the Hull fish trawling industry in 1864-1875 it demonstrates that the exploitation of apprentice labor, and the control of fishing apprentices through punitive master-servant prosecutions were vital to the expansion of the trade.
Taylor, by virtue of his apprenticeship, was legally unfree, which compounded his dilemma with the power of the court. Yet variations of Taylor's case were repeated hundreds of times in Hull in the midVictorian period for workers under regular conditions of service. Indeed, despite his polemical retort that England was a free country, tens of thousands of workers during this period were similarly caught in the web of the criminal justice system for disobeying the dictates of their employers. What is striking is that this particular form of exploitation, a regular occurrence in a number of regions in England during the Industrial Revolution, has received so little attention.
L A W , A P P R E N T I C E S H I P A N D T H E L O C A L S T A T E
The ways in which the English legal system was integral to labor exploitation in the nineteenth century was highlighted by a now classic essay by Daphne Simon in 1954 on master and servant law, the precursor to modern employment law. 2 Simon explored how this aspect of labor law was used, particularly in the first half of the century, as a strategy for labor discipline. Simon claimed that by the mid-Victorian period its use was on the wane, a relic of older forms of labor organization largely supplanted by industrial development. While Simon's essay established an important agenda for research on the role of legal systems in general and the courts in particular in nineteenthcentury economic development and change, this path was largely neglected the next four decades. 3 A review of contemporary surveys of the British industrial revolution and nineteenth-century economic development shows at best cursory attention to these issues. 4 Indeed, in his recent survey of the role of government in the Victorian and Edwardian era economy Roger Middleton observes:
It is generally agreed that in no other advanced industrial economy has the law played a less significant role in shaping industrial relations than in Britain (Clegg 1970: 343) ; it was voluntary dealings between capital and labour, variously organised, that determined the form and pace of developments. This voluntarist tradition dictated a non-interventionist stance by successive governments and suggests that, so far as economic performance is concerned, it is what governments did not do rather than what they did do that may be critical. 5 detailed analyses by these authors illuminate the ways in which master and servant law (to which I return below) legally tethered workers to capitalists for most of these two centuries. Charting the lineage of the Master and Servant Act of 1823, this history reveals that legally unfree labor was at least as much of a product of capitalist demands on the state originating in mid-eighteenth century, as it was a vestige of a feudal past.
More generally there has been renewed attention to the role of state in nineteenth-century economic transformation. As Ron Harris suggests in a recent survey of state activities,
The state seems to have surfaced almost everywhere in the economy. It not only regulated markets but also created them. It not only protected property rights but also defined them. It did not either own enterprises or leave them to be owned by private individuals, but was also a partner in joint public-private undertakings, be they new modes of transportation or new imperial conquests. It seems more appropriate to speak now of the state within the economy rather than of the state and the economy. 8 A good deal of work on the role of the state in labor policy has focused on factory reform, working conditions (especially with regards to women), and the legal status of trade unions. 9 Despite this increased focus on the state two lacunae remain. First, much of this research focuses as much or more on battles over legislation rather than on the actual enforcement of laws and their effects on industrial discipline and workplace relations. 10 Yet, as Richard Price has cogently observed, ''The British state was the law, and how the law was applied determined in particular cases whether the state was strong or weak. '' 11 Second, and relatedly, the state in mid-Victorian Britain was, in Anne Digby's term, the ''local state''. 12 For most working people the state was manifest in the local authorities that upheld the law, and the face of authority was very often that of the magistracy. Over the course of the nineteenth century magistrates' courts were given greater scope of authority and heightened powers of summary jurisdiction. 13 In terms of statutory laws on employment and combination and common law assumptions concerning contract, and in the case of trade unions and conspiracy, the local bench certainly was the touchstone of power.
14 Given the considerable latitude provided to local authorities to exercise this power, it makes less sense to make national characterizations of a ''weak'' or ''laissez-faire'' versus a ''strong'' or ''interventionist'' state in economic affairs, than to analyze the scope and reasons for regional variations in the uses of the law. As Pat Hudson argues, ''When one comes to analyse the role of the state directly and specifically in promoting British regional growth it is the role of local government at the county and sub-county level which requires attention. '' 15 The analysis below is part of a larger comparative project that examines the varied ways in which capitalists in mid-Victorian England, both large and small, and including both urban and rural employers, drew on the power of the local state to enforce work discipline, exert control in the labor market, and assert their authority in the employment relationship.
One goal is to demonstrate that unfree labor, as constructed through master and servant and other laws, was vital for the development of particular industries given strategic considerations such as the flexibility of the labor supply and recruitment, a stable and dependable source of labor power, and the costs of extraction and non-productivity due to worker resistance. Legal servitude that is not forced labor -much as the increasing control through deskilling, technology, production games, the gender and racial/ethnic divisions of the labor force, and other mechanisms -helped secure the subordination of labor and sustain capitalist development in a number of industries.
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A second and allied goal is to demonstrate how this subordination depended upon local magistrates' and borough courts for the effective exercise of power. Employers who had access to sympathetic benches or who were themselves embedded in varying local elite networks of power giving them privileged access to the court, could rely on the law as an 14 16. My project focuses on those industries in which master and servant law was an active and regularized feature of the employment relationship. However, we should keep in mind that employers in many industries, both factory-based and craft-centered, relied on markedly different forms of stability and control in the workplace. James Jaffe has recently emphasized that employers in some artisanal trades such as printing focused on what he terms a ''giftexchange'' relationship. This was a bargain in which the employer allowed for discretion in the workplace and the worker exercised his skills in return. He notes that magistrates frequently used such informal agreements as the basis to arbitrate disputes without formal recourse to the law; James Jaffe, Striking a Bargain: Work and Industrial Relations in England 1815-1865 (Manchester, 2000).
answer to their labor problems. They turned to the local court when they lacked sufficient control of or predictability in securing labor in free markets and in control of the labor process. Part of the regional variability in the use of master and servant law as a solution, as I argue below, was assured access to dependable and sympathetic justices. This intersected with regional variations in the structure of labor markets, skill requirements for labor processes, technological development and expenditures in fixed capital, and a number of other considerations to produce a complex set of causal forces that determined the need to rely on the law as a means of labor control and discipline. In the end only detailed regional empirical studies of a variety of industries will provide us with sufficient insight to account for these variations.
A final goal particular to this case study is to clarify the importance of apprenticeship and youth labor, another form of unfree labor, in nineteenth-century English capitalist development. Though K.D.M. Snell has termed the debate over the decline of apprenticeship as one of the most ''chaotic'' in English social history, many economic historians offer a Whiggish view of the institution, suggesting that it was largely a relic of an early economic system. 17 Clark Nardinelli, for example, straightforwardly asserts that,
The industrial revolution ended apprenticeship. The early factory masters employed an apprentice workforce because no other was available. Free children, however, rapidly replaced apprentices in the textile industries in the early nineteenth century. Furthermore, as modern industry replaced handicraft industry, the institution of apprenticeship began to disappear throughout the economy. 18 With a few exceptions child labor in general, and pauper apprenticeship in particular, are seen as artifacts of the early nineteenth century, a phenomenon caused by a need for industrial labor and eventually obviated by technological advances. 19 As Snell observes, the traditional system of apprenticeship was unmoored from its institutional roots to craft, parish, and family and mutated into a number of skill-training variants. To the extent that apprenticeship extended into the latter part of the nineteenth century, it has been depicted as a self-enforcing system by which youths (largely though not entirely males) were able to gain entrance into a trade in exchange for service.
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Certainly with the textile industries, mining, many workshop industries and agricultural labor increasingly regulated by parliamentary acts, the use of apprentice and youth labor became more problematic, and technological change diminished the demand for youth labor in other trades. However, during the mid-Victorian period there was a substantial increase in the number of male children under fifteen employed in navigation, dock work, and on the railways. Moreover, as many historians note, despite the ill-repute of pauper apprenticeships, they remained a potentially important means for parishes to reduce their fiscal burdens. 21 This study illustrates how youth labor in general and a degraded form of apprenticeship in particular, could still be vital to the process of industrial expansion. As I demonstrate, this was particularly the case when apprentice labor could be disciplined and controlled through the law.
M A S T E R A N D S E R V A N T L A W
Through the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century, land-based workers labored under a form of contractual agreement that was substantively unfree. 22 While these laws had distant origins in the sixteenth century, in their current form they were part of a transformation of the law in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that increased capitalists' capacity to hamper growing worker resistance. 23 In effect, master and What was required in service devolved to a matter of customary practices for each trade and locale in the lieu of any written standards. 24 As Carolyn Conley observes of the Victorian local criminal courts, [:: :] the findings and actions of the criminal justice system were primarily determined by the values and priorities of the local community. Whether a particular action was defined and treated as a crime depended on a number of important factors, among which the written law was often the least important. 25 As she suggests, local courts were generally guided by the interwoven concerns of respectability, order, and class. Justice was never rendered through the blunt instrument of class interest, but ''respectability meant behaving in a manner according to one's status''.
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In some regions the volume of such cases adjudicated by local magistrates prompted them to be quite knowledgeable mediators concerning labor arrangements and customs. However, in many areas, such as Hull, the magistrates could enforce a respectability that served employers' interests well, meting out justice with stringency. And this justice could sting. Workers were subject to dismissal, abatement of wages, and/or up to three months imprisonment with hard labor if convicted. High court rulings during the period also established that no punishment released the worker from his or her service obligation. 27 Maritime workers faced a similar legal situation. The Merchant Shipping Act of 1854 imposed up to ten weeks imprisonment for unauthorized leave and twelve weeks and a forfeiture of all wages for desertion. It also empowered magistrates to order the forced return of the seaman to the ship to continue duty, and to permit the transfer of a seaman on board a vessel in the middle of serving a sentence should his labor be required by his master. Further, the Act provided for the master or ship owner to seize a seaman without warrant and hold him on board for twenty-four hours prior to a hearing, voiding basic civil liberties. This law remained in force until a clamor for revision in 1880.
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Under both the Merchant Shipping Act and the Master and Servant Act employers were subject to civil sanctions for inadequate treatment, improper dismissal and failure to pay wages. 30 These involved fines, voiding of contracts, and court-ordered payments, and as civil cases there were no aggregate statistics recorded of their frequency. In the Hanley borough court for the period the volume of charges by employers far outstrips claims by workers, and this is probably the case for almost all areas in the nineteenth century.
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Annual Parliamentary reports show that for the mid-Victorian period until its repeal in 1875 there were generally around 9,000 to 11,000 cases which were within the range of convictions for petty larceny, breaches of the peace, various misdemeanors, and begging. 32 the mid-Victorian era an experience with criminal justice, outside one concerning drinking or fighting, was about as likely to concern work as any other sphere of life. There was wide regional and industrial variation, and one town in which there was a high number of convictions was Hull.
As Table 1 overleaf demonstrates, beyond assault or drunkenness, the working people of Hull were as or more likely to be convicted summarily of a violation of master and servant law as of any other single criminal offence most often connected with their class. Moreover, proportionately master and servant convictions for these years hovered between 4 and 7 per cent of the town court's total summary convictions, which was between two and three times higher than the national percentage.
By 1872 this town of about 125,000 people was the third largest port in England, shipping about 9 per cent of all its exports (amounting to £23 million) and receiving almost 5 per cent of all imports (or £16.5 million). It specialized in exporting manufactured goods from the industrial north, as well as coal and cattle. Imports were largely raw materials, such as timber and cotton and foodstuffs, such as corn and oilseeds. Trade was anchored in the Baltic region, but there was also a substantial global network of shipping ties. This trade fostered a substantial seed-crushing industry of 37 mills, several extensive cotton hemp and flax manufactories (the largest employing 1,500 hands), perhaps the largest concentration of furniture makers in the country, several large paint and coatings manufacturers, and of course a major shipbuilding industry for both steam and sailing ships, with the largest yard employing about 2,000 workers. In 1871 transport employed almost one-quarter of the male workforce, metal trades and engineering 14 per cent, the building trades 10 per cent, followed by other industries in the single digits. The upstart trawling industry employed less than 3 per cent of all males. 33 Hull had its share of both strikes and unionism during these years, particularly among skilled workers such as shipyard engineers, oil millers, Police-Criminal Proceedings-Prisons. Returns for the year''. As Hay notes, the ratio of master and servant prosecutions amounted to 12 to 32 per cent of all theft prosecutions, and this ratio would have been higher except that the ''enormous expansion of summary convictions for theft had changed the denominator of the ratio''; Hay ''England, 1562-1875'', p. 108. and the building trades. However, it does not appear that the town was known for especially contentious labor relations. It had a higher proportion of unskilled to skilled labor than many other large English towns, and as a port had a substantial transient workforce. 34 In the last decades of the century, during which time the local economy experienced its most significant growth spurt, strikes and union organizing became more prominent features in both engineering (including shipbuilding) and transportation. 35 At the beginning of 1867 a Trades' Council was formed comprising 7 unions and about 650 members and a month later boasted an additional 10 unions as members. By this period many of the larger trade groups had formed unions, including the seed-crushers, coopers, tailors, typographers, and various building trades. 36 The prosperous years of the early 1870s witnessed Hull engineers reorganizing under the banner of the United Marine Engineers' Association, and a variety of trades campaigned successfully for the nine-hour day. During this period the Lincoln Amalgamated Labour League also successfully established ties with many of the local unions. However, the fishing industry was never organized, and on the whole organized collective action was infrequent. 37 During a few such events employers sought the assistance of the local bench, particularly during strike actions involving larger firms. They used prosecution as part of a repertoire of tactics to intimidate workers and cow strike leaders. 38 The major shipbuilding firm, Humphry and Pearson, prosecuted striking workers in 1871. Company representatives successfully used master and servant law to force a group of platers back to work on the claim of insufficient notice. 39 In May 1867 the North Eastern Railway Company summoned ten engineers, following the same strategy to quash a major strike of railworkers. 40 On the whole, though, court records and newspapers show that capitalists in Hull's major industries resorted to such criminal prosecutions sparingly. Rather, the use of the law was highly concentrated in the much smaller fish trawling trade.
The trade was a relatively recent development in Hull's economic history, a product of the discovery of extensive fishing grounds in the deep waters off the Yorkshire coast in the 1830s and 1840s and the extension of the railways. The industry developed rapidly in Hull, Grimsby, and other ports in the 1860s. In the early 1850s there were only a few dozen fishing trawlers (or smacks as they were generally called) in Hull; by 1863 they numbered about 270 and by 1873 there were some 330 smacks. A new fully equipped fishing smack sold for at least £1,000, though used trawlers were perhaps half to two-thirds of that price. The self-made masters of Hull's fishing trade often heavily mortgaged their vessels, ''working off'' the payments with each catch. The proportion of fixed to variable capital was actually higher in fishing than cotton manufacturing, and from the start many ship owners found themselves in highly leveraged positions. 41 Newspaper accounts for the period point to at least fifteen smack-owners filing for bankruptcy. 42 It is difficult to reconstruct the finances of these smack-owners, but a rough indication can be gleaned from the Registry of Ships for the port of Hull during the period. All smacks were registered with the port as well as a record their financing (including their mortgages) and sale. 43 Reconstructing the record of the smack-owner responsible for the most convictions of fishing apprentices during the period (see Table 7 , p. 272), Thomas Halfyard, shows a dynamic web of financial entanglements.
Between 1860-1875 Halfyard was involved in eighteeen sales of smacks and underwrote twenty-three mortgages for these and other vessels. On the other side of the ledger he took out thirteen mortgages himself, about 41 two-thirds of the them from a London fish factor. Overall, Halfyard appears to have maintained a positive balance sheet of several hundred pounds over much of the period between his own mortgage payments and the income from his borrowers. However, in the early 1870s, with a series of mortgage payments due on vessels, the balance might have tipped the other way. Halfyard's mortgages for vessels he purchased were generally £400 to £500 at 5 per cent, while those he underwrote when selling vessels were generally in the £600 to £700 range. His loans were usually paid back within a three-year time span, though those of his buyers were often over four to five years. It is impossible to determine the percentage of his total income that Halfyard generally received through the selling and underwriting of his older fishing smacks.
The ship registers do suggest a very active market in smacks and one in which larger fleet owners were cogs in the chain of a growing port fleet. They depict a trade in which credit sources were largely internal, with loans mostly provided by smack-owners selling vessels or fish merchants. 44 The sheer volume of this trade, which increases over the course of the period, hints at a growing speculative market with the expansion of the industry. However, exactly how much capital was represented by a port's fleet in this period is open to question. A Grimsby smack-owner, testifying before the Commissioners of Sea Fisheries in 1866, noted that because of highly speculative loans £300,000 invested in smacks had only procured about £100,000 worth of vessels. 45 A major Hull smack-owner, Alfred Ansell, reported in 1869 that 242 Hull smacks were worth about £149,000.
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The rate of return on investment is also unclear. William Markchow, a Hull smack-owner testifying in 1866, claimed that 5 per cent could be achieved with careful management. In a latter report the Inspectors for the Commissioners suggested that for the trade as a whole a smack could net £70 to £80 a year, though testifying before a Parliamentary committee in the early 1880s, a Grimsby smack-owner maintained that his average profit rate over the previous five years was at best 2 per cent. 47 While rates of return might vary, however, mortgage payments were a constant. Many smack-owners depended on regular runs to stay afloat. As a contemporary commercial review noted, ''There is little romance with the history of this trade''. 48 The work was considered some of the least desirable in the port, and despite its rapid growth smack-owners had difficulties recruiting reliable crews. These crews were small laborintensive units, consisting of only five including the skipper. Between solo voyages in the winter generally lasting ten days to three weeks, to fleet voyages of thirty or more smacks in the spring and summer going from eight to as many as fifteen weeks, smacks were at sea at least forty weeks a year, regardless of the weather. The crew was housed in a single small cabin in often miserable conditions, and remained in their work clothes throughout the voyage in order to respond quickly to orders. The cabins themselves were frequently flooded, and hands complained of inadequate maintenance of the vessels. Such small vessels were not subject to port regulation or inspection. A full day at work frequently involved at least two trawls, one during the day and one at night, which in bad weather could take two to three hours, and left little time for anything besides navigation, maintenance, meals, and sleep. The historian, John Rule quotes one observer of the trade describing the routine at sea as ''suffering -monotonous ceaseless suffering''. 49 Moreover, given the small size of the boats and periodic transference of boxed catch by small boats to cutters for shipping, the work was extremely dangerous, ten times more so than mining.
50 From 1876-1882, for example, 304 men and boys sailing on Grimsby fishing smacks perished.
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Adult crew members, generally the skipper, the second, and sometimes the third hands, received shares of the gross from the catch (net of deductions for provisions), with the smack-owner receiving the remainder. This assured their interests were aligned with the smack-owner. However, casual adult labor for the lower positions was considered too unreliable, 48 . Trade and Commerce of Hull, p. 133. 49. Rule, ''The Smackmen of the North Sea'', p. 385. 50. During fleet voyages, which could encompass as many as seventy boats and lasting perhaps eight weeks, smacks would regularly offload boxes of their iced catch to cutters which would speed the fish to a principal port for sale. Boxes were placed in small boats manned by a couple of hands who navigated them to the waiting cutters. Fishermen objected to the system, particularly during the winter, because of the precariousness of negotiating the sea; PRO and smack-owners generally could not compete with the shipping industry's going wages for able seamen. Needing a cheap and secure labor force to fill out the crews, smack-owners turned to the apprenticeship system. 52 As Rule comments, ''the smackowners solved the problem of labour supply in a way which strikingly recalls the methods of the factory masters of the early Industrial Revolution: they relied on poor-law apprentices''. 53 By the 1860s there were two forms of apprenticeship, indoor and outdoor. The former group were housed with their master (generally a lesser smack-owner) who, in addition to room and board, was responsible for all other basic provisions such as clothing for both sea and shore. Outdoor apprentices received wages of between 7 shillings and 16 shillings per week in lieu of having their room and board provided. Typically, they were bound to fleet owners, though indoor apprentices after the age of seventeen or eighteen might request a change to this status. Apprentices of either type were the fourth hands and cooks (and sometimes served the position of third hand as well). The former was responsible for watch, handling the smack in good weather, steering the small boat, taking soundings, gutting fish, and other tasks. The apprentice cook was the lowest hand and newest member who assisted the fourth hand, cleaned the deck and performed basic maintenance, and coiled the warp net when it was retrieved. Smack-owners were not obliged to pay their apprentices any wages, but it was customary that they were to receive a portion of the stockerbait, or money received at port for the sale of inferior fish. While not required, a modest amount of weekly pocket money was also traditional, especially for older apprentices. 54 As a labor source they were frequently as capable as a grown man, though training did take several years and the return on the initial sunk investment was largely during the second half of the apprentice's term. Apprenticeship systems in the nineteenth century were clearly never free labor, and the trawling industry's was no exception. Estimates vary, but at least one-half of all apprentices were bound by their parents and were generally locals. However, as the trade rapidly expanded in the 1870s, it increasingly came to rely on Poor Law Unions, reformatories, and other institutions as a labor source, and was indiscriminate in its recruitment. The lack of experience at sea made many such apprentices only a liability 52. While the system was started with the inception of the trade in the 1840s, it became common after it was used to break strikes of fishermen's unions in 1852 and 1856; Robinson to themselves once at sea. 55 Pamela Horn suggests that pauper apprentices were more valued because they were more easily subject to coercion, and the historian of the industry, Robb Robinson, observes that ''Many apprentices were treated by the smack-owners as their personal property''. 56 With some hyperbole, a contemporary London paper pronounced the apprentice system in the trawling industry as ''a system of slavery as infamous as any system of slavery every devised''. 57 Complaints about maltreatment by crew members were common, and many fisherlads preferred to commit crimes or refuse to obey orders so that they would be sent to jail rather than to sea. Increasingly, many absconded completely or ran away as the smacks embarked. 58 Those disposed toward the industry argued that charges of cruelty were often inventions of apprentices to break their binding, and that troublesome and confrontational fisherlads often drove the crew to administer tough discipline. ''I quite believe'', noted Baldwyn Fleming in his report on the Grimsby pauper apprentices, ''that many punishments which look serious when the subject of magisterial investigation have been inflicted with a rough and ready hand -perhaps with undue severity -but with no thought or intention of malicious cruelty''. And he maintained that all the apprentices he interviewed stated that they ''were fully aware that if ill-treated they would have no difficulty in obtaining redress''. 59 Hull apprentices frequently claimed abuse as a reason for absconding.
On occasion, an adult hand would be prosecuted by an apprentice for abuse as an assault, since the more severe cases generally involved beatings (often with a rope and termed ''rope-ending''). During the years reported here there were at least a dozen such prosecutions, all involving assaults of some form. 60 Most commonly these adult hands were ordered to find sureties of between £20 and £100 to keep the peace, though sometimes they were released on their own recognizance. In two cases fines of between 20 shilings and 50 shillings were exacted, the latter for the stabbing and pitching overboard of a fisherlad by a captain. The most severe punishment was meted out to a smackhand who hit an apprentice over the head with a poker, cut a piece of flesh out of his arm with a belt, rubbing saltpeter in the wound and eventually threw the boy into the sea. Apologizing and admitting drunkenness, he was given two months of hard labor, a sentence that, as we shall see, was commonly administered to the fishing apprentices themselves for absconding. When a smack-owner fired a skipper or other adult hand for mistreating an apprentice the abuser was readily hired by another owner, given the constant need for experienced labor.
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In addition to the rough conditions and often poor treatment, older apprentices came to resent their comparatively paltry compensation. Smackhands and able seamen, who were often not much older, earned substantially more. During the back years of their terms, when they became most valuable to their masters, apprentices fully realized the extent of their exploitation. Absconding was seen by many apprentices as a means of rectifying this injustice as well as escaping their demeaning circumstances. As the number of apprentices increased, so too did the problems of keeping them compliant and bound for their full service. One smackowner reported that a deserting apprentice could cost him £30 to £50 a week in replacement wages and lost revenue, a considerable sum for a small capitalist.
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To maintain this system of cheap labor smack-owners turned to the borough court headed by the stipendiary magistrate, Thomas H. Travis. As the court for cases of summary jurisdiction, charges under the Master and Servant and Merchant Shipping Acts were adjudicated before it. 63 Stipendiary magistrates were modeled on the professionalized London 60. In late 1864 and early 1865 the skipper and smack-owner, Thomas Hamlyn, and his second hand John Anderson were brought before the bench on a charge for the death of an apprentice named Kisner. However, at the time the court deemed there was insufficient evidence. It is unlikely that Hamlyn was convicted of this charge, since court records show him as a prosecutor of fisherlads in 1866 and in intermittent years throughout the period; 63. Under the Master and Servant Act, workers could also sue for wages in the county court which was maintained for small claims. I have recorded a small number of such cases from the local papers for the study years, but they pale in volume to those before the local magistrates. metropolitan judiciary. As opposed to local borough justices, stipendiaries were experienced barristers who were paid a substantial salary to preside over local courts or circuits. Parliament authorized their appointment at the request of the local municipality or area, and they had lifetime terms. Despite the legal machinery for their installation, only ten stipendiaries had been appointed by the passage of the Stipendiary Magistrates Act of 1863, which extended the possibilities for such appointments. Where they did exist, as in Hull, they exercised a major presence in the local justice system. 64 Travis was first appointed as stipendiary magistrate in 1854. He presided over the bulk of the borough cases, though Hull also had a number of magistrates appointed from the ranks of the borough alderman. 65 In reference to a dispute over increasing his salary, the Hull and Eastern Counties Herald observed that ''of all the unpopular men in Hull, it may truly be affirmed that Mr Travis enjoyed the least amount of public favour'', though he clearly had a group of supporters in borough government. 66 In addition, there are indications that he was integrated with the local commercial elite through charitable institutions. In a couple of respects Travis models Conley's characteristics of Victorian justice mentioned above. In civic life Travis appeared as a stern moralist, speaking out against the scourges of criminality and drunkenness. 67 He envisioned himself as a strict and impartial upholder of the law, and so far as that benefited working people, a champion of their interests. As he noted in a worker intimidation case against shipyard strikers, ''He would stand on the side of the men whenever and by whomsoever they were tyrannised Hanley. Additionally, they do not seem to have been among the political elites. Two large smack-owners, Alfred Ansell and Henry Toozes (of Vivian & Toozes) were leading members of the South Myton Reform Association, this being the ward with the largest number of electors and the highest concentration of smack-owners. Both were elected councillors for the district, along with their fellow smack-owner Christopher Pickering, in the early 1870s. They were all Liberals, the normally dominant political force in the borough. However, there is no indication that as a voting bloc they were key players in local politics, or that they had any indirect influence on the borough magistrates; Hull and Eastern Counties Herald, 3 October 1868; 18 February, 11 November 1869; 6 November 1873; 1 January, 26 February, 15 October, 12 December 1874; 9 November 1875. 65. Exactly who should be appointed was a subject of periodic squabbling; Hull and Eastern Counties Herald, 7, 26 July 1866; 8, 22, June 1871. 66. 21 June 1866. On several occasions over this period there were rancorous debates about increasing the salary of the stipendiary and his clerk that divided the borough council; Hull and Eastern Counties Herald, 9 March 1865, 26 July 1866, 5 June 1873. 67. Hull and Eastern Counties Herald, 1 January 1864, 2 August, 21 October 1869.
over; and on the other hand, he would stand on the side of the masters whenever an attempt was made to do them wrong''. 68 When workers could clearly demonstrate wage claims Travis readily ruled in their favor, as demonstrated by the percentages in Table 2 . 69 As Table 2 shows, workers were successful in winning claims for unpaid wages between half and two-thirds of the time, with the bench arbitrating a settlement in roughly 10 per cent of the cases. As Hay suggests, many magistrates sought to portray themselves as indifferent arbitrators in work disputes. 70 Where non-payment of wages was clear, Travis and other magistrates could maintain their stance as impartial and strict upholders of the law, a position which they hoped would buttress their convictions of workers. However, Travis's stance of strict adherence and his emphasis on moral propriety set him up as a ready conduit for those who sought to use master and servant law as a means of labor control. 71 Mr. Travis remarked that it was very well for people to talk about the hardships fisherlads had to undergo; probably some of the good people had never been in police court themselves. Let them hear both sides, and then come to a conclusion. He had had experience of thousands of cases, and he confessed that his feelings were with the boy when he first commenced, but they were not so now. The balance of good was decidedly with the masters. 72 To analyze the centrality of master and servant prosecutions to the fish trawling industry I have compiled data on all labor cases heard before the court from 1864 to 1875 using the Hull magistrates' clerk's minute books.
73 I have supplemented this data set by collecting all labor cases mentioned in the weekly ''Police Reports'' section of the Hull and Eastern Counties Herald, which provides summaries of many of the cases heard before the borough court over the previous week. A review of all labor cases before the court from 1864-1875 and of the fishing trade cases in particular reveals the extent to which the latter industry relied on the court as a means of labor control. Table 3 shows the percentages of cases all master and servant prosecutions that involved disorderly apprentices and the percentage of these cases in turn that were of fisherlads. The numbers are bluntly telling. Virtually all prosecutions during these years were of disorderly apprentices and roughly three-quarters were of fisherlads, despite the fact that they constituted at most no more than 1 per cent of the entire male laboring population of Hull. Moreover, assuming a contemporary estimate that there were about 750 apprentices in the mid 1870s, then about 20 per cent of this group was caught up in the criminal justice system for almost all of these years. 74 Tables 4 and 5 overleaf can be used to compare the sentences meted out servant prosecution concerning a shipyard apprentice, ''In olden times the apprentice was the domestic servant of the master, and he should contend strictly that in the present day an apprentice was bound to work at all reasonable times. This was a most important principle''; Hull, p. 132 . Despite their readiness to prosecute, smack-owners were frustrated with the legal machinery to do so. Under the Master and Servant Act a summons had to be issued for a servant believed to have left work without permission. If the summons could not be delivered a warrant could then be obtained. Smack-owners complained that they were required to take out summonses for absconding apprentices, knowing full well that they were fleeing, and that the possibility of having a policemen arrest them in the process was diminished since they had to return to court for a warrant; Hull and Eastern Counties Herald, 2 October, 13 November 1873. to the fisherlads and to adult seamen prosecuted under the Merchant Shipping Act, which had comparable if not more severe sentences for deserters. Once again the numbers are striking. First, the sheer number of fishing apprentices cases is always larger, despite the fact that their representation in the maritime labor force was vastly smaller. Second, the percentage of prison sentences shows a clear imbalance. At an 82 per cent average rate of incarceration the fishing apprentices were fully twice as likely to be sent to prison as seamen for similar offences, such as disobeying orders or absconding. Table 6 shows the distribution of sentences received by fisherlads. With the most common sentences being twenty-one, thirty, and seventy days in prison with hard labor, convictions were highly punitive. Interestingly, notations in the minute books indicate that around 20 to 30 per cent of these fisherlads were released to their masters prior to the completion of their sentences, and during one hearing Travis complained that ''[t]he only fault he had with some masters was that they were too anxious to take their boys out of prison before the expiration of their punishment''. 75 The data suggest that through both the apprenticeship and criminal justice systems smackowners found the means of controlling a portion of their labor supply that could not be maintained through a free labor market. On the one hand, they needed a supply of inexpensive labor to be able to insure that their net return from each voyage allowed them to work off mortgage payments and expenses and make a profit. On the other hand, this labor pool was young, often bound against their will, and became more valuable as a source of profit the greater their experience at sea. Therefore smack-owners were reluctant to part with apprentices, and indeed the records show very few such annulments of indentures.
The answer was to use the criminal justice system both as a means of threat and coercion -a disciplinary tool that could be used repeatedly and reliably against obstreperous apprentices -and also as a holding pen for this labor supply. Long sentences insured that apprentices could not flee in between voyages. The extent to which smack-owners were granted the early release of their charges also indicates that the punishment itself was secondary to securing access to this labor supply.
In Travis and the borough court the smack-owners found sympathetic ears. As Conley argues, the actions and pronouncements of the court need not be interpreted as an example of naked class interest. Rather, seen through the linked lens of bourgeois order and respectability, the waywardness of the fisherlads represented a serious problem, particularly given their often pauper origins. The concern of smack-owners was expressed by Alfred Ansell in 1869 at a meeting of the South Myton Reform Association -the biggest borough ward and the one with the 75. Hull and Eastern Counties Herald, 6 March 1873. largest concentration of smack-owners -in which he noted that steps had been taken to ''improve the moral condition of the fishermen'', and that the decline in the number of apprentice prosecutions from the previous year was a signal of their success. 76 These actions were best exemplified by the room and school inaugurated for fishing apprentices at the Fish Street Chapel in the latter 1860s. Characteristic of the times, the school provided regular Sunday Bible study classes, and by 1875 it claimed to have had 1,300 to 1,400 participants in them. Its reading room was open several nights a week, it made available savings accounts, and had an annual tea that drew between 100 and 200 fisherlads each April. Some of the largest smack-owners were involved in its governance, including Ansell, its secretary, who was also one of the main prosecutors of apprentices during this period. The school mirrored the larger concern of smack-owners and town elite for fishermen in general, which was reflected in their founding and maintenance of a Fishermen's Institute. The Institute was similar to the mechanics' institutes of the times, and sought to provide spiritual and intellectual outreach and sustenance to the growing legions of adult fishermen. 77 Less systematic evidence from the nearby port of Grimsby, where the trade grew even more rapidly (eventually dwarfing Hull) suggests a similar pattern. Fleming's 1873 report into the status of apprentices in that town records that for the previous administrative year (1 May 1872-30 April 1873) there were 251 total cases involving fishing apprentices, 208 for absconding, 33 for disobeying orders, and the remainder for other offences. 78 Of these, 10 per cent of the prosecutions represented repeat offences, 62 per cent of the hearings resulted in convictions, a somewhat lower rate than in Hull, and the most common sentences were of two and three weeks' imprisonment. In Grimsby magistrates relied on the Merchant Shipping Act for prosecution, which the Hull magistrates turned to after the repeal of the Master and Servant Act in 1875. It is not clear why the latter justices chose a different legal foundation, nor exactly why, after the reformation of the Merchant Shipping Act in 1880, they interpreted it sections in a way that stopped them for using it for further prosecutions while their Grimsby counterparts continued to do so.
It is apparent from the data that employers in the trawling industry were the only Hull capitalists to employ the law systematically as a means of labor control. As Table 7 overleaf shows, nineteen of the top twenty prosecutors were smack-owners. 80 The paucity of all other master and servant prosecutions during this period, and the relatively low percentage of prosecutions of seamen under the Merchant Shipping Act give credence to the argument that the practice was employed by smack-owners, given their control of the labor supply, the labor process, and their requirements for cheap labor to stay afloat. As Fleming himself noted in his report on the Grimsby apprentices, ''For its ensuing continuance and development, it is absolutely necessary that the lads should be obtained as apprentices to the trade.'' 81 Many smackowners were heavily mortgaged. They faced a growing but also increasingly competitive trade, not only among their peers in Hull, but also from the trawlers of nearby Grimsby, Whitby, Scarborough, and other ports in the south as well. 82 Moreover, it is probable that an increasing proportion of their labor force was also the least enthusiastic, i.e. Poor Law Union boys who were bound to relinquish their home parishes of a burden. A number of these apprentices were shipped considerable distances, including from London parishes. As Boswell suggests, many were physically unprepared for the rigors of the sea. 83 Legal action became a lynchpin to keep this system of exploitation in motion. The Master and Servant Act, coupled with apprenticeship binding, insured that smack-owners had unlimited power over this portion of their labor supply. The borough court and police provided a ready enforcement mechanism for this power. Drawing on the authority of the criminal justice system, smack-owners were not only able to create a potent disciplinary system, they were also able to securely house recalcitrant labor at the expense of the borough until needed for use. This was certainly not a system of slavery, but in its darker dimensions there are some disconcerting parallels.
By 1880 the industry in Hull alone employed some 1,200 apprentices, and there was probably a larger number in Grimsby. 84 There were by then 420 smacks with some £500,000 invested in Hull's trade. 85 Changes in the Merchant Shipping Act and the passage of the Payment of Wages Act in 1880 led to the abandonment of apprentice labor in Hull, though in Grimsby and perhaps other fishing ports the practices waned more slowly. This was in part because of variations in the local labor supply. As an 1894 Parliamentary report noted, ''if there had been at Grimsby the same supply of weekly hands as there is at Hull and Lowestoft it is probable that the apprentice system would have died out as it has done in other ports ''. 86 Perhaps this is why the Hull magistrates interpreted a critical section in the Merchant Shipping Act regarding willful disobedience as applying to onboard behavior only, while their Grimsby counterparts understood it to mean desertion as well. 87 Such was the nature of the local state. As a result apprentices in Grimsby continued to abscond in substantial numbers, and many fled to Hull where their labor was finally and fully freely contractual. 88 As the beam size for the trawl grew, increasing the efficiency of the labor, casual labor replaced apprentices in most other ports. Youth labor became less vital and smack-owners relied on a larger transient labor pool. More importantly, by the 1880s the Yorkshire fleets were beginning Table 7 . Most frequent prosecutors of apprentices by number of convictions, 1864-1875 to lose a competitive battle with a burgeoning Scottish industry, and the trade experienced a slow decline. 89 C O N C L U S I O N Reflecting on the industry, Robinson remarks, ''It remains ironic that a trade which benefited so much from laissez-faire on the high seas should have relied so heavily and for so long on such a tied and ragged labor force.'' 90 However, as the role of unfree labor in England's economic development during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries becomes more fully exposed this reliance perhaps will seem less ironic. For growing industries with an increasing need for workers to fill unskilled, lowpaying, and undesirable jobs, urban parishes were all too willing to relieve themselves of unwanted pauper charges in the form of apprenticed labor. Indeed, even after considerable unwanted public and parliamentary scrutiny in 1882 after two publicized brutal deaths of fisherlads at the hands of their skippers, the trawling industry continued to rely heavily on apprentice labor as a mainstay. 91 As importantly, the Hull case provides a glimpse at the ways in which master and servant law and local courts provided a venue for the exercise of labor discipline and control. Elsewhere I have detailed the ways in which pottery manufacturers drew on these laws as important means of keeping their skilled male workers in line in the absence of alternatives. In that work I show that many of the largest and most prominent employers in the pottery industry in Hanley, Staffordshire relied on master and servant law to keep their skilled male workers in line. 92 Even though the production process employed a high division of labor, it still depended on manual skill and was carried out in workshops without much direct supervision. Capitalists could not easily introduce the discipline of steam-powered machinery, and lacking other alternatives, even the large pottery manufacturers looked to the magistrates' court as an effective means of discipline. 93 The annual parliamentary reports from 1858 to the repeal of the laws in 1875 suggest that these two trades were hardly unique. Moreover, the tenacity with which employers from industries such as iron-making, coal and iron ore mining, the building trades, and others opposed the abolition of the criminal provisions of master and servant laws suggests their utility for a variety of capitalists. 94 Further research on these industries and in earlier decades of the nineteenth century (especially prior to the era of parliamentary reports for which we lack data on convictions) are necessary to establish the extent of and reasons for its use.
The Hull case suggests that Daphne Simon's depiction of master and servant law as being a waning vestige of a bygone era is somewhat off the mark. 95 Hull trawling masters turned to apprentice labor and the discipline of the law precisely when she argues it was in its last throes. And while this study does affirm her assertion that master and servant law was a coercive tool of small masters, other recent work, including my own study of the Hanley earthenware manufacturers, suggests that this claim too should be re-examined. 96 As we have seen, fishing trawler owners were not major players in Hull politics and most cases were administered by a stipendiary magistrate. That high rates of successful prosecution could occur in front of benches of quite different composition raises questions about the specific institutional development of local legal cultures in areas where employers turn most frequently to the law. Pottery manufacturers were heavily represented on the borough court and had a very cordial relationship with the Potteries stipendiary magistrate, and workers had for years raised complaints about the partiality of justice in the town. 97 Certainly, previous work by Woods and others alerts us to an institutional culture of prosecution across many towns and industries in the Black Country. 98 These variations suggest that we need additional local studies to develop a better understanding of how these legal cultures germinated, and how employers institutionalized a turn to the law in their repertoire of labor discipline.
Beyond these standout areas for prosecution, however, we need more investigation into how master and servant and other law colored the web of relations of authority and control in the workplace. As the counsel for the Mining Association of Great Britain readily acknowledged, the mine owners he represented used the law ''in terrorem'', with its threat as effective a disciplinary tool as an actual prosecution. Similarly, the manager of the enormous Dowlais Iron Works in Wales, which employed 11,000 in all of its operations, noted that he used the law sparingly, but that, ''I see that taking a man down to Merthyr [Tyfdil] and fining him, and in default of his paying the fine sending him to prison, restrains scores and scores of men from committing the same act probably for a month or so.'' 99 Hay and Craven suggest, indeed, that in England the vast majority of conflicts were settled ''in the shadow of the law'' without ever reaching the bench. 100 Finally, Hull and other cases suggest a need to focus more on the role of the courts and the power of the local state in nineteenth-century economic development. As the nineteenth century progressed more local magistrates were drawn from the ranks of manufacturers, middle-class professionals, and tradesmen sympathetic to the concerns of the first group. With the passing of the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835 the consolidation of bourgeois control quickened in pace. Heightened powers of local courts and their increasingly reliability for employers led to increasing ire and calls for reform among working-class leaders. 101 Even as Britain projected its imperial power around the globe with the aid of a growing state bureaucracy in the capital, it was the local court that was the touchstone of power for ordinary people and their worlds of work. Further research need to chart the ways in which capitalists in industries and regions around the nation relied on the power of this local state even as they trumpeted the virtues of laissez-faire.
